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Corporations, Associations and the State: The International Subsidy System for
Film
Abstract
Rather than increasing competition in the market and decreasing government spending, neoliberalism has
driven states to compete by appealing to transnational corporations. Direct subsidization to attract
investment has become one of the most egregious normalization of this process, and Hollywood and the
film industry have become some of the most active participants to this system. Indeed to have a
functioning film industry, government subsidies are essential, commonly paying out up to a third of the
production costs. Per employee these are some of the highest subsidy rates of any industry, and with
most of the world participating, they offer little long-term benefit to anyone besides the most global
Hollywood studios. Rather, this creates greater dependency on the Major film studios by local
government, workers, and small production companies to attract large production spending, but end up
supporting an ever expanding system of subsidization.
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Today there is the normalization and expectation that film production
undertaken by multinational media corporations based in Hollywood (and hereafter
referred to as the Majors or Studios) will be subsidized by some level of
government--local, national, or foreign. Subsidization of production costs--literally
paying for a portion of the filming costs--is so pervasive today that most studios,
and especially the multinational Majors that dominate the global industry, require
it when choosing a location. Even the countries that have a history of film and
cultural protectionism have adopted this strategy to attract Blockbuster productions
for the sake of jobs and investment from the Majors. While this follows standard
trends in market concentration in many industries, film production is especially
notable due to its flexibility in production. That film productions are temporary,
commonly shot on location, and consequently mobile, means production Studios
do not need to permanently maintain crew, studios, and equipment in all locations
they shoot. As a result, Studios have maximized their flexibility in shooting on
varied and diverse locations, both within the U.S. and abroad. This results in
Studios maximizing choices regarding where to shoot films. Thanks to this and
their political, market, and financial power, the film industry has long established a
pervasive and international system of countries competing for film investment
through subsidies. I will refer to this as The International Subsidization System.
Film subsidization has a long history, but since the 2000s this International
Subsidization System reformed itself as a core component of Hollywood
production. Under the common neoliberal defense to gain “jobs and
competitiveness,” numerous provinces, states, and countries have joined in
subsidizing film production in order to attract this very mobile industry. For film
and other industries this has generated a “race to the bottom” where competition no
longer exists simply on natural qualities (such as the most appropriate shooting
location for film or studio infrastructure), or even regulation competition (such as
wage and safety provisions), but has swung in favor of supply side factors so that
the choice of production location is heavily determined by direct cash transfers
provided to the requisite film or media corporation. Naturally this has resulted in
an advanced form of race to the bottom, where, in combination with downward
pressure for wages, unionization, and regulation, states are participating in
financing production with no direct return on investment. The Majors claim that
subsidization will bring employment, local production spending, and production
infrastructure that is often advertised as contributing to a self-sustaining local
industry. However, as will be seen, with the number of governments participating
in film subsidization, the returns on government investment have mostly proved
elusive.

There has been much debate over the efficacy of corporate subsidization
before the particularities of film subsidization are considered. Thom (2016, pp. 1)
shows that “...some evaluations find positive (Wu, 2008; Zhang, 2015) or mixed
effects (Langer, 2001; Wilder & Rubin, 1996), others provide no evidence of
positive long-term impacts (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Prillaman & Meier, 2014;
Taylor, 2012).” Others argue that subsidization has little effect on location choice
for production (Lynch, 1996) and is thus simply paying for production that already
exists. At best, positive outcomes from incentives and subsidies tend to be fleeting,
either as the market catches up to the adjustment (Thom, 2016), or as competing
programs crowd out initial gains of early adopters (Thom and An, 2017). The
mobility and temporality of these projects, as well as the expanse of the
subsidization scheme, means film subsidization should be one of the least useful
industries to subsidize. Despite this, or perhaps because of this fact, the leading
industry lobby, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), has actively
supported the cultivation of this system due to the direct benefits such subsidization
provides to their corporate members. As such, in 2011 film subsidies took up nearly
2% of total subsidies within the US. While seemingly small, when compared to the
largest subsidized industry of auto manufacturing at $5 billion, in 2012 the cost per
employee was $12,465 for Film Production while “only” $6,745 for Auto
Manufacturing.1

Runaway production
This direct subsidization of industries is uniquely high in film due to the
mobility of production. While film production may conjure up images of artificial
sets and warehouses, location shooting has long been central to the industry and
was a major reason for choosing Hollywood as a primary location due to the varied
ecology of California. Because the end product could easily be distributed across
the country, there was little necessity to stay in New York, the original film capital.
In fact, to be a film production company and distributor, ownership of a physical
studio is not always necessary, such as United Artists, which was a production
house “Studio” with no actual studio. Rather than directly own a studio backlot, the
company would produce films and rent studios as needed. Without this overhead,
producers are easily able to choose between locations and studios based on their
needs. This particularly flexible and mobile aspect of film production led to its own
industry term of “runaway production”. While good from a studio’s point of view,
the derogatory nature of “runaway” was developed from the perspective of critics
who saw production, investment, and jobs unjustly leaving Los Angeles. More
1

See Story, Fehr, and Watkins (2016) for subsidy amounts and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and U.S. Census Bureau (2015) for employment numbers.

generally, this attests to the inherent flightiness of such temporary and mobile
projects, which grew under neoliberal capitalism as flexible production became
normalized.
This project-based and temporary nature of film has a large impact on
transforming run-away production into an industry wide norm (Thom and An,
2017), but the nature of film production also plays a major role. Because of clear
segmentation of production, one film can easily be done in multiple locations. This
includes not only the actual filming, but also with pre- and post-production, which
has even fewer locational requirements. With computer graphics and the use of
green screens, many of the artists and film workers do not even need to be in the
same location. This manner of production has itself helped solidify the labor
delineation with the film industry, between “above-the-line” and “below-the-line”
labor. The former includes the higher paid jobs, such as producer, writer, director
and actors, while the latter refers to more physical jobs such as technicians, grips,
set artists, and stagehands.
In relation to the supply chain hierarchy, these labor categories can be
considered “higher value-added” and “lower value-added,” but also relates the
mobility of production. Much of the creative, above-the-line work can be done
anywhere, and the few who need to be on location, such as directors or leading
actors, can be flown in to location. Below-the-line labor is more replaceable and
not transported with production. As a result, runaway production tends to benefit
above-the-line who travel with production, while below-the-line become more
dependent on the mobile production attraction. In the end, this has helped solidify
labor groups, including unions, in working with the MPAA and other associations
to expand film subsidies, usually for their short-term benefits, but ultimately for the
longer term and larger benefit to non-replaceable talent--such as famous actors and
names used for advertisement--but especially for the leading Major Studios.
Runaway productions greatly helped the Major Studios combat costs and
labor power concentrating in Hollywood. Even during the peak of the Studio Era,
where film and theater concentration was at its highest, there were infamous clashes
with unions representing numerous sectors of Hollywood production. The focal
point of these Union-Studio battles in the 1940s (Spaner, 2012). Most notably was
the Black Friday battle, which started with picket lines led by the Conference of
Studio Unions, which shut down productions at Major Studios, such as Warner
Bros. While many were injured in the fight, many more were arrested and fired.
Despite initial concessions on wages, the Major Studios still retained much
concentrated power and state support; ultimately the Conference of Studio Unions
was disbanded and incorporated into the much more malleable International

Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. While the Majors retained their
monopolistic hold on all sectors of film distribution, production, and exhibition
they had more ability to placate or end any strong unions. However, as that power
faded in the decades following the Paramount Decree, the 1948 antitrust suit that
ended film studios from owning and monopolizing theaters, the Majors
increasingly focused on international markets. This was done both to recoup their
revenue beyond the growing competition of indie studios, but also to lower
production costs and their dependence on Hollywood labor.
It is thus with the Paramount Decree that Runaway production became an
institution for the Majors, as well as a tool for retaining control after losing theater
investments (Scott, 2002; Christopherson and Storper, 1986). With the loss of
assured exhibition for all films, the so-called “Fordist” production of the Studio era
necessarily ended. No longer would production be churned out like a factory, with
overlapping sets, actors, and plots. Without control over exhibition, the large,
integrated, factory-like studios became a larger liability for the Majors. The Decree,
as a result, helped bring about what Christopherson and Storper (1986) calls
Flexible Specialization. This term refers to the creation of a specific and particular
product, as opposed to mass production of general products, with the means to
quickly change or refocus effort and equipment, usually done through a network of
smaller producers. Film was especially conducive to this manner of production,
especially as the Mass production of the Studio Era gave way to an increasing
reliance on mobile production.2 Much like other transnationalized industries, the
Majors could use studios, labor, and locations around the world in a replaceable
fashion, thus developing the network of smaller producers needed for Flexible
Specialization. Not owning studios or permanent employees in these varied
locations allows the Majors to quickly shift location and change productions, while
the ownership of Intellectual Property and ability to finance Blockbusters allows
the generation of specific and unique products. It was then up to the disposable
locations to attract these productions through skills, infrastructure, and
subsidization. The start of this Subsidization System had its strongest expression in

2

It was likely that the monopolized production and exhibition of the Studio Era itself was
resulting in the particular style of product and consumption. However, as broadcast television was
increasingly competing with theaters the days of mass production for film were likely already
numbered. The Spectacle of the big screen, along with selling points such as “cinerama”,
“cinemascope”, and early on the use of sound, would no longer be enough to get customers out of
the house once they had a television. As a result, specialization of film itself was increasingly
necessary to draw a crowd that was becoming content with cheaper television production,
resulting in increased budgets and greater need to reduce costs. See Crafton (1999) for a history of
the early role of technical innovation in film and Seabury (1926) for a history of Major Studio
control prior to runaway production.

runaway production leaving Hollywood for the Canadian West Coast, still
relatively nearby.

International Subsidies: Canada and Europe
As Davis and Kaye (2002) reveal, Canadian theaters have always been
dominated by the larger market to the South, to a degree that the Canadian market
has been integrated enough to be considered as part of the “domestic market” by
the MPAA. Canadian films generally makes up 5-10% of the “Domestic” revenue
box office, of which Hollywood films “account for approximately 90 percent.”
(Davis and Kaye, 2002). By the 21st century, Foreign (American) productions in
Canada even made up 85% of Canadian film exports (Davis and Kaye, 2002;
CFTPA 2008). While Montreal and Toronto hold their own in film production, both
in foreign and domestic productions, it is Vancouver on the less populated West
Coast that receives half of production spending (Davis and Kaye, 2002). While this
is part due to geography and proximity to Hollywood, the politics of International
Runaway Production along with the subsequent Subsidization System, is the largest
factor.
Prior to the 1990s, Canada, much like other states, was weary of Hollywood
and thus focused their film subsidization schemes on protecting culture and
promoting domestic art. In the 1960s much of Canadian film production came from
the more populated East Coast, resulting in British Columbia on the West lagging
behind both in media consumption and production, resulting in an underdeveloped
cultural industry. As such, as Hollywood increasingly looked toward foreign
productions as a means to lower budget cost and circumvent local unions, British
Columbia saw the opportunity largely in terms of “regional industrial development”
and a means to “a way to attract immigrants, capital investment, and tourists”
(Gasher, 2002). As such, unlike other programs that were at least initially directed
toward domestic production and culture, the British Columbia subsidy scheme was
specifically designed to target mobile Hollywood productions and develop a local
industry out of that relationship (Gasher, 2002). As much of the Canadian media
consumption in British Columbia came from the East Coast the likelihood of
developing a fully independent local industry was already low and thus the larger
and closer Studios of Hollywood had more to offer.
Initially as Vancouver began to take larger shares of film production in
Canada, national subsidies continued to focus on developing and protecting cultural
industries, with much of these funds going to the more developed media industry
on the East Coast. These cultural protections continued into the 1990s, including

cultural exceptions being a large part of Canadian goals during NAFTA
negotiations. Much of Europe was facing similar conflicts with Hollywood, both
over cultural concerns as well as keeping subsidies to domestic studios rather than
Hollywood. However, it was the active and direct solicitation of Hollywood Majors
by British Columbia's subsidization scheme that shaped how governments would
attract Runaway Production in the future. By the late 1990s state-to-state
competition for Hollywood productions began to take shape. This is concurrent
with Canadian national film subsidies shifting from focusing on cultural to
economic indicators, tacitly opening up these funds to foreign productions. EU film
subsidies also began to downplay cultural concerns to the advancement of
immediate and short-term concerns, as did individual US states who began to rely
on subsidization to compete for jobs and growth in their local industries. By the
21st century, an entrenched International Subsidization Scheme had been
developed, based entirely on neoliberal logic of open markets, transnational
production, and supply-side support, to the disproportionate benefit of the
Multinationals of the MPAA.
Europe
The European film industries followed a fairly similar experience to
Canada. Though not included in the “Domestic Market” as Canada is, Western
Europe saw early dominance from Hollywood. However, while European subsidies
would sometimes reach Hollywood productions, the goal in attraction of Runaway
Production, as pioneered by British Colombia, only reached Europe once the
International Subsidy system was already in full swing. Many Western European
states initially had a more robust domestic film industry to protect, with more
independence compared to Canada. As a result there had consistently been stronger
political support to attempt to rebuild a competitive industry. This was especially
true following WWII, when Hollywood was very much dominant across the
Atlantic. In perhaps an early demonstration of the transnationalism that
neoliberalism would soon bring, the mixture of protectionism, subsidies of
European industries, and reliance and dependence on American products and firms,
actually helped lead to Europe eventually joining the Subsidy System.
The fragility of the economies in Europe following the war left many
industries with the precarious situation of needing immediate goods while also
needing to rebuild competitive industries. For film, even for countries like France
as an inventor of the medium and especially concerned with culture and language,
this meant a relatively wide opening for American films for European consumers,
whose demand could not yet be met domestically. With this vulnerability and
dependence, there were few ways for these states to combat the power of

Hollywood. These included direct protection of domestic film production that
conflicted with the post-war trade system; subsidization of domestic film, initially
around cultural products; limitations on the repatriation of profits by foreign
producers, to force local investment in production; and integration of local
production into the Hollywood system, to attempt to move up the hierarchy rather
than exit it.
This interaction of means of production, which ended up feeding the
industry hierarchy rather than opposing it, can best be seen in the operations of the
British film industry and development, which has always been more closely
integrated with the American industry. While London participated in similar means
to revamp their film industry following the war, they also were more accepting of
integrating their industry into the larger and more global American multinationals.
As early as the 1950s, Britain set up a subsidy scheme known as “Eady Pool of
Funds”. This was a tax on movies, which would then be given as a rebate to film
productions that were considered “British” (Lev, 2003. p. 153). However, due to
American financing and runaway production many of the subsidies went to
American productions or co-productions with American financing (the latter has
become an increasingly important and growing trend in today’s system). The “Eady
Pool "was of decisive importance in persuading U.S. producers to shift operations
from Hollywood to London" (Bernstein, 1960, Quoted in Lev, 2003, pp. 153). Even
the measures stopping Hollywood from repatriating profits back to America ended
up supporting transnational productions, as the capital stuck in European countries
were used to fund productions there, helping to blur their nationality and thus their
access to these early subsidies.
As Britain saw economic success with its willingness to integrate into
Hollywood’s international system, as well as supporting the Hollywood system
politically and economically, other states began to open up to such competition as
well. “France and Italy had similar, but less generous, subsidy programs. Though
the original intent had been to support national film producers, Great Britain, Italy,
and France were willing to subsidize Hollywood film companies as well in order to
stimulate film industry investment and employment” (Lev, 2003, pp. 153). As these
production markets increasingly become infiltrated by Hollywood, by 1960 40% of
“...movies financed by Hollywood majors were shot overseas.” (Monaco, 2003, pp.
14). Most of this was in the UK with two-thirds of their films having Hollywood
financing. However, Italy and France, known for strong cultural protectionism,
were integrated into the production as well, with 3 out of every 10 French
productions having Hollywood financing (Monaco, 2003). In 1962, Hollywood got
$5 million in subsidies from Britain, Italy, and France alone (Monaco, 2003, pp.
12).

Expansion of Subsidies: American States
Despite Europe inadvertently subsidizing some Hollywood productions, the
early adopters of the model to attract runaway productions were still British
Columbia, with American states following soon after--a process which helped to
further consolidate the International Subsidization System. This exponential
expansion can be seen in the chart below. This immediate adoption of subsidies by
other states was likely a result of relative success in attracting Major productions
for the early subsidizers, such as British Colombia. However, the early successes
were heavily due to the lack of competition from other locations. As other
governments developed their own subsidies to attract production, these benefits
eroded while the expectation to fund production continued. Even existing film
centers, such as California and New York, adopted subsidizing local productions,
and themselves have allocated some of the largest funds to stop production from
leaving. Others, such as Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, like many of the newer
countries to the International Subsidy System, were attempting to create a new local
film industry, ostensibly one that would eventually be self-sustaining, presumably
on the assumption that their own subsidies would be able to sustain localized
benefits despite rising competition.
Number of Incentive Programs and Funds3
Year

3

Number of U.S. States with Film Incentive Incentive Amounts Offered
Programs

1999 & earlier 4

$2 million

2000

4

$3 million

2001

4

$1 million

2002

5

$1 million

2003

5

$2 million

See McDonald (2011) for 1999- 2011 figures and Bishop-Henchman (2016) for the 2012 figure.

2004

9

$68 million

2005

15

$129 million

2006

24

$369 million

2007

33

$489 million

2008

35

$807 million

2009

40

$1.247 billion

2010

40

$1.396 billion

2011

37

$1.299 billion

2012

40

$1.4 billion

Louisiana was one of the first states to adopt film subsidies to develop a
local production industry. Having an already established a cultural and tourism
industry, as well as a temperate climate to allow shooting year-round, Louisiana
became a sensible choice for film production. But their entry into subsidy
competition was as much about attempting to attract existing production away from
other locations, as it was of creating new production. This was followed by a New
Mexico scheme, which became part of the first wave of developing a competitive
subsidization among US states (Thom, 2016). Although these schemes had the
intent, much as the British Columbia scheme pioneered, to focus on economic
benefits opposed to the classic subsidies for culture, they had not reached the
financial extent and broad-participation that made up a fully competitive system
until the 2000s (See amount offered between 2003 and 2004). As Tannenwald
(2010, pp. 3) reveals:
Until 2002 state film subsidies were limited in scope. A few states offered
film producers small credits against income taxes, deductions from taxable
income for losses incurred in production, or loan guarantees. Other

subsidies were confined to the provision of public services at no cost (for
example, police details, ready access to public lands, assistance in
identifying locations, and expedited permitting), or exemption from sales
tax on purchases of goods from local vendors and from hotel and lodging
taxes for employees working on an in-state movie shoot. These subsidies
may or may not have been the best possible use of funds, but they were lowcost and therefore relatively harmless.
Preston, in elaborating further on this first, more limited phase of
subsidization during the 1990s and early 2000s and specifically using Louisiana as
a case study, wrote that “For the first ten years of its existence [started in 1992],
Louisiana’s program underperformed (Grand 2006, 792-793), and any film
production that had been lured away from Los Angeles or New York typically went
to Vancouver, British Columbia.“ (Preston, 2013). By the late 1990s competitive
subsidization began to be seen as essential for maintaining a decent film industry,
driving many other states to compete with their own subsidies. By 1997, the
Canadian government began remodeling their national film subsidies around their
perceived economic interest, taking their cues from the early success of British
Columbia and Vancouver. Likewise, Hawaii (in 1997), Missouri (in 1999) and
Oklahoma (in 2001) developed their own systems, and Louisiana and New Mexico
once again followed the Canadian model and substantially expanded their subsidies
in 2002 (Thom and An, 2017).
While the number of competing subsidies expanded across North America,
and later internationally, the subsidies expanded also in amount of funds and in how
they were offered. Away from the indirect subsidies described by Tannenwald for
early schemes, subsidies have since developed into direct cash transfers. The varied
and indirect subsidies include those for housing, finding skilled workers, or even
location scouting, but the more sought-after and costly subsidies have been tax
credits. These subsidies can be divided between transferable tax credits and
refundable tax credits (Thom, 2016). Transferable tax credits are tax waivers
offered to a production company for a set amount, usually a percentage of
production costs, which can then be sold to another party for a discount on the
waiver amount. Thus, the purchaser receives a discount on their potential tax
payment, while the producers receive immediate cash to offset production costs.
While transferable credits offered immediate cash, refundable credits offer a direct
transfer of cash to the producer for the full amount of the credit (McDonald, 2011).
These aggressive and large subsidies have, according to Thom, had modest impacts.
Employment was most affected by transferable credits, while wages were most
affected by refundable credits, but for both affects the benefits were short-term. To
view the extent of the long-term problems, dependence, and entrenchment of the

corporate oligopoly it will help to examine some case studies of US states, followed
by an analysis of the global subsidy system. Here I will examine three of the larger
domestic subsidy schemes--one to retain and recoup production (California), one
that failed and ended (Florida), and one with strong and continuous expansion
(Georgia).
Florida
Florida is an interesting case in examining its subsidy program due to the
extent, length, and relative large-scale size of their program, which was later
discontinued. Florida was one of the possible locations for the first movie moguls,
as Jacksonville was scouted along with Hollywood due to its climate. Florida also
possesses relatively strong production in Orlando and Miami, both as an on-site
location for production as well as a location for Spanish-language television. As a
Southern and “right to work” state, Florida also holds weak unions, which
according to neoliberal proponents (including the MPAA itself) should make it a
front runner for a successful development of film infrastructure. As such, compared
to many of the other participants in production attraction and subsidization, Florida
should have been one of the stronger candidates for successful development of a
strong local film industry. The fact it did not have success will help illustrate both
the inherent problems and limitations of subsidies, as well as the contradictions in
a competitive subsidy system, whereby permanent subsidies become necessary.
Florida started its initial film incentive program in 1993, following soon
after the Louisiana program. And, much like Louisiana, this early Florida program
was missing the direct cash transfers described above, only offering the smaller
incentives that were common at the time. This still had the goal of attracting mobile
film production, but had a much smaller impact, both in budget and effect. Initially
this incentive program was developed under the Florida Entertainment
Commission, but it was reshaped into a specific office, The Office of Film and
Entertainment (OFE) in 1999, within The Department of Economic Opportunity
(Wilcox and Krassner, 2014). The transition into the OFE occurred with the general
normalization of expanding subsidies, along with the inclusion of direct cash
subsidies, again following along other expanding models in North America.
Despite Florida still getting a relatively early start, already at its founding in 1999,
the OFE had received a budget expected to grow year upon year, which would be
necessary to compete with a sizable number of subsidy programs.
As with other subsidy schemes, to legitimize the program as not simply
corporate welfare but as jumpstarting local industry, the original legislation
authorizing the program had a mix of language emphasizing the creation of

production infrastructure and attracting production from other regions. It is
interesting to note that the OFE website today has a much stronger emphasis in
attracting production from other regions, rather than generating new production in
Florida. Like other schemes, the proponents of this excessive spending also
emphasize the indirect multiplier of film tourism, an easy target for the economy of
Florida. Once again the influence of the Major studios and the MPAA are evident
in the drafting and implementation of the film subsidization programs. The MPAA
is a member of local film associations, in particular Film Florida, which, like
lobbying projects in other states, publishes the purported economic benefits of
subsidies, with a special emphasis on tourism, due to the indirect and thus
unfalsifiable connection--more tourism becomes an anticipated outgrowth of
locating film production in the host state. News organizations and lobbying groups
reference these MPAA reports when providing data pertaining to the efficacy of
subsidies.
As the budgets for competitive subsidies ballooned in the first decade of the
2000s, by 2010 the Florida Legislature passed The Entertainment Industry
Economic Development Act, which allocated $242 Million to the OFE to
incentivize and attract film production to Florida. This budget was designed to
cover a five-year period, after which it could be supplemented with more
subsidization. This, however, led to failure and the eventual dissolution of the
subsidy budget for two reasons. One, although high in total, spread over 5 years,
this would have been relatively small compared to the leading subsidizing states,
such as Georgia and California. As such, Florida was likely hedging its location
and natural attraction, but having a smaller than average budget within a race to the
bottom would likely have been unsuccessful, given the pattern of other halfsupported programs in South Dakota and Indiana, which did little in the way of
generating an independently sustainable local industry (Thom, 2016).
However, the program in Florida was not terminated due to tepid responses
to a smaller than average budget, or after the number of programs diluted the
success of early adopters. Rather the end to the program came relatively quickly as
the money dried up due to the lack of a spending cap per project--an outcome which
reveals the propensity toward corruption and lack of accountability inherent to such
programs (Thom and An, 2017). Without a cap, the cash ran out “nearly
immediately” due to the money being made available on a first-come-first-serve
basis (Walser, 2016). Cash was given out to any production that qualified, rather
than based on an analysis of cost and benefits to measure whether or not such
spending produced lasting infrastructure or recurring production. In subsequent
years supplemental additions were given to the budget, but without a fundamental

change these too were quickly depleted in the same manner. By 2013 no
supplements were added, and the Florida subsidy system was out of funds.
The limited effects and quick depletion of film subsidy programs in Florida
have been criticized for a loss of jobs and production in the state. Interest groups,
including “Enterprise Florida,” the state’s economic development arm that
incentivizes companies, and “Visit Florida,” the state’s tourism marketing arm, had
advocated recreating a subsidy system to retain possible production, utilizing the
rhetoric of defending Florida jobs (Irwin, Oct 20, 2017). Two leading groups in this
effort are Film Florida and COMPASS Florida. Film Florida is a lobbying group,
representing numerous groups including film schools, local producers or
associations, and even Universal Studios. Film Florida is very much the local
component to the MPAA, and acts to promote local legitimacy for the maintenance
and expansion of a film subsidy system in the state. Like in other states, Film
Florida has been a participant in commissioning favorable reports with which to
lobby politicians and provide the public with positive figures pertaining to the film
subsidy program. Film Florida also works in partnership with the OFE, but has also
pushed for taking over the subsidy fund as a public-private partnership, citing lack
of marketing skills by state agencies (Film Florida, 2013). COMPASS Florida is
likewise representative of related film unions as well as small businesses.
To keep up with the ever-increasing subsidies among competing states
(especially neighboring Georgia), the suggestion was for $1 Billion in subsidies
(Hanks, January 29, 2014). As of now, the trade and labor organizations have put
forward a more modest proposal for a “Florida Motion Picture Capital
Corporation.” Rather than offer subsidies through cash transfers, the “Capital
Corporation” would operate as a “more traditional investment mode” and
theoretically make money, though where initial funds would come from are unclear
(Irwin, October 20, 2017). However, in step with criticisms of corporate welfare,
greater emphasis is placed on allocating resources based on “...which projects
create the greatest number of high-wage jobs…” (Taddeo, 2018). In the meantime,
local municipalities have started to get in on subsidies with Miami-Dade creating a
$100,000 local subsidy program (Hanks, July 19, 2017). Miami has emerged as a
focal point for the Florida film subsidy system, as South Florida had received 78%
of program funds by 2013 (Hanks, January 29, 2014).
Georgia
As some states see little hope in competing with innumerable locations and
massive subsidies (North Dakota) or have otherwise ended their subsidy system
with failure (Florida), Georgia is commonly held up by proponents of the system

as an example of success, with a relatively strong production industry in an unlikely
state, concentrated around the capital of Atlanta. In recent years Georgia has found
itself in competition for the leading destination of production for the highest
grossing films, along with California, New York, and international (and strongly
subsidized) locations of Canada and the UK. However, unsurprisingly, it finds itself
with one of the highest budgets for its subsidy program, trailing only New York.
Having spent multiple billions over the life of its program, Georgia can attribute its
“success” to entering this inevitable “next tier” of cash transfers. Thus, while
Georgia may compete with residual strength (but still large subsidies) of California,
and the giant subsidies of New York, it does so without caps to spending, without
emphasis on independent productions and new projects that California emphasizes,
and without a focus on local labor.
With loose requirements from producers and some of the highest and most
friendly incentives, Georgia is able to match the leading domestic locations of
California and New York, and then surpass them through cheaper labor and
locations (especially compared to New York which can partially explain their high
budget). Georgia is also commonly seen as being the leading competitor for
“southern” locations, beating out Louisiana, and likely one of the reasons for
Florida to drop out of the subsidy race. The movie Live By Night is a great example,
being set in Ybor City, Florida, yet being shot in Brunswick, Georgia thanks for the
30% tax credit offered (Irwin, October 20, 2017). Other Florida-based directors has
discussed moving future productions to neighboring states such as Georgia and
Alabama, either from a necessity to compete in a low production cost environment
or to also generate further pressure toward an expanded incentive program
(Boedeker, November 30, 2014).
While the success of Georgia is heavily a result of attracting existing
production, it also reveals other problems with such schemes. Georgia has faced a
shortage of film crews (McWhirter and Schwartzel, 2015). Despite offering no
subsidy cap on salary, as well as offering incentives to non-resident workers,
specifically to attract production as opposed to generating it, the state has found it
difficult to retain such mobile labor and investments. Due to these limitations, the
large Georgia program has been in the crosshairs of the same organizations that
helped end the Florida program, including libertarian Koch groups. Georgia has,
instead, doubled-down, increasing their budget, thanks to overstated claims of
economic benefits from the program, usually from reports again commissioned by
MPAA and local partners. These reports have been utilized to prolong and expand
such programs by greatly overstating their benefits for the state using an outdated
and fairly arbitrary multiplier to calculate program impacts. The multiplier effect
(the compounding effect of incentive money being put into the local economy)

itself becomes overstated by using a very optimistic assumption of how much
money from film production stays in Georgia. In fact, much of the subsidized costs
are not permanent nor are they limited to local labor. “Georgia’s 30% credit is not
only more generous than that of most states, including California’s; it also allows
producers to count salaries of directors and actors in addition to below-the-line crew
as part of their qualified expenses, as long as the payment is for work performed
within the state.” (Johnson, 2015)
Studio Advertising in Georgia:

Georgia conditions: Georgia advertisement of benefits:
● 20 percent base transferable tax credit
● 10 percent Georgia Entertainment Promotion (GEP) uplift can be earned by
including an embedded Georgia logo on approved projects and a link to
ExploreGeorgia.org/Film on the promotional website
● $500,000 minimum spend to qualify
● No limits or caps on Georgia spend, no sunset clause
● Both resident and non-resident workers’ payrolls and FICA, SUI, FUI
qualify
● No salary cap on individuals paid by 1099, personal service contract or loan
out. Payments made to a loan out company will require six percent Georgia
income tax withheld
● Production expenditures must be made in Georgia to qualify from a Georgia
vendor
● Travel and insurance qualify if purchased through a Georgia agency or
company
● Original music scoring eligible for projects produced in Georgia qualify
● Post-production of Georgia filmed movies and television projects qualify if
post done in Georgia
● Development costs, promotion, marketing, license fees and story right fees
do not qualify

California
Unlike Florida and Georgia, California has been much more reactionary in
response to the subsidy system. For much longer local producers and unions have
been complaining of investment flight and the loss of jobs and wages. The earlier
experience for Californian film workers, along with L.A. being the “home” location
of the Majors, makes it an especially important case study. California may have not
been the originator of the subsidy system (Canada and Louisiana) but it was an
early exercise for the MPAA to learn how to increase dependency within the
industry, generate industry control on the supply-side as well as through labor
flexibility, and to use the Hollywood location to reinforce the Majors’ position in
the industry hierarchy. “The industry trade group quarterbacked the campaign to
stop "runaway production." The MPAA rounded up a broad coalition, including
chambers of commerce, labor groups, and cities up and down the state. Offering a
bonus for productions outside Los Angeles helped win over Northern California
lawmakers, who have traditionally opposed tax giveaways to a Southern California
industry” (Maddaus, 2014).
Employment by state:4
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The Majors are not only the major utilizers of mobile productions and
subsidies, but also a leading voice in expanding those subsidies. Rather than
assisting in the development and expansion of local film production industries in
California, the systemic nature of subsidies, all supported by the MPAA, end up
canceling each other out and largely operates to further the transnationalization
objectives of the Major Studios. As seen in the previous figure, labeled
“Employment by State,” California, and in particular L.A., continues to be the
largest production center for film. As with all subsidy schemes, it has been
suggested that one-third of the subsidized productions would have remained in
California anyway, weakening the case for subsidization as a necessary
contribution for retaining film industry investment and jobs in the state (BishopHenchman, 2016).
Although California has long been experiencing the process of “runaway”
film production, the state had been relatively slow in participating in the subsidy
system. This was likely due to the already existing local infrastructure and supply
networks for the industry. Because of the obvious narrow benefits of such types of
subsidies, the need to legitimize both infrastructure and temporariness seen in other
states did not quite work in California. It is only with the entrenchment of the
subsidy system in other states, did California come late in 2009 toward a more fullblown participant in the International Subsidization system, which has expanded in
recent years as California has become one of the leading domestic state subsidizers.
It was in 2009 that the political and economic power of the Majors in
California bore institutional fruit, with the creation of a $100 million “Tax Credit
Program 1.0” under the California Film Commision. This budget cap was expanded
in 2015 to $330 million (with program 2.0), making California one of the leading
participants in competitive subsidies. Like the suggested “Film Corporation” in
Florida, Program 2.0 has a large focus on project selection based on jobs, and with
a more diverse project allocation, with 40% devoted to TV Series, Pilots, and
Television Movies; 35% to Non-independent Films (read: Majors); 20% to
Relocating TV Series; and 5% to Independent Films. The strong emphasis on TV
series (60%) means production that provides more stable and permanent jobs, but
also is connected to the majors and owners of the distribution-channels for such
production (Maddaus, 2014). The fact that 20% of funds are specifically allocated
to relocation of TV series also reveals the growing focus on relocation for such
programs, rather than the creation of production that would not otherwise have
existed.
McDonald (2011) argues for a national subsidy system, as the state subsidy
system, which again are some of the leading subsidizers in the world, does not

create new production, and rather results in a race-to-the-bottom subsidization of
existing production. While this would help reduce the race to the bottom
domestically, the Majors would still have options to exploit the international
system, and location choice would continue to operate on merit second and cash
transfers first. The largest to lose out would be local indie producers and labor,
unless they themselves are mobile. Such a national system would benefit
Hollywood and California, and disrupt existing dispersed production infrastructure,
such as from Georgia, while the Majors would continue to benefit as the
international subsidy competition would continue.
Largest Box Office Revenue Film Production locations5
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International
Some countries such as France, whether due to cultural protectionism or
relative size of the market, had been able to build domestic industries semiindependent of the Majors, even if they do participate in subsidies. Germany,
however, is an especially interesting case, as it has a relatively strong industry,
decent international reach from its movies, and a history of film and cultural
protection comparable to France, if not quite as strong. Despite this, Germany
developed a reputation of having its subsidy system, which had initially been
developed to strengthen the domestic industry, exploited, especially by the Majors
of Hollywood. With subsidies as high as 55% from federal and state (Länder)
sources (Jansen, 2005) foreign producers accessed these “domestic” subsidies
through co-production deals with domestic entities, much as was done earlier in
Britain. While Germany has since cracked down on these “in name only” coproductions, the financing deals that helped the majors integrate and penetrate the
European production markets, have become increasingly commonplace and
continue to be a key component of the International Subsidy System.
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider provides an excellent example of utilizing
multiple locations, pre-sales, subsidies, and partners to reduce risk on a strong
budget. With a budget of $94 million, according to Epstein (2005) the main
production company, Paramount (Viacom), only paid in $7 million, leaving $84
million from other contributors, including state subsidies. Germany is a prime
example of subsidy abuse by transnational corporations, as the conditions in its
Film Funds did not reflect the social utility of either jobs for locals, protecting local
culture, or developing a domestic film industry. Germany also had some of the
largest subsidies: 250 Million Euros in 2005. Instead “German law simply requires
that the film be produced by a German company that owns its copyright and shares
in its future profits.” (Epstein, 2005). Paramount’s German partners were KFP
Produktions GmbH & Co. KG, whose only credits on IMDB are Tomb Raider and
licensing of Tomb Raider footage, and Tele München Fernseh
Produktionsgesellschaft (TMG), which moved into domestic TV production after
these film subsidy loopholes were cut.
The notoriety and ability for abuse of German subsidies were quickly
integrated into the general operations of Hollywood. As Lindsey (2006) notes, “No
wonder then that this source of funding was commonly referred to in the
boardrooms of LA as ‘stupid German money” (quoted in Cooke, 2007). As the
Subsidy System was still developing in the early 2000s, the German exploitation
was especially notable. This brought the German Chancellor's Grand Coalition to
make “pulling the plug” on these funds one of their first actions in November 2005.

While some funds were cut with an ostensible goal toward “New German Cinema”
rather than Hollywood productions through German entities, this process coincided
with the entrenchment of commercially driven market subsidies. As such, while
ostensibly new subsidy programs would focus on arthouse films and around
director visions, they were designed for German and European films to compete
commercially on an international scale (Cooke, 2007). With the EU being a driver
toward commercial subsidization, and Germany retaining both national and state
subsidy programs, this reliance on market-driven subsidies (as opposed to a cultural
and art criteria) leads to a contradiction that does little to halt the race-to-the-bottom
effect of subsidies. As Europe focuses on local commercial films they can still
partner with the larger productions from Hollywood as the Majors focus more on
globally targeted blockbusters.
As a result of Germany’s unique position relative to its smaller neighbors
Germany has plans to expand its already large and numerous subsidy programs
(Deutsche Welle, 2017). However, with the clear strength of Hollywood Majors
and the international entrenchment of subsidy systems, this increase of subsidies is
without the traditional focus of cultural concerns. As such, the results have been to
entrench the oligopolistic position of the Majors by contributing to a two-tiered
system with two characteristics: 1) European filmmakers are subsidized to compete
on the “medium” level film market, as Hollywood increasingly focuses on the
global blockbusters. This allows leading European producers to break through the
idiosyncratic local market and increasingly compete internationally, essentially
creating a second-tier mini-major status. 2) Continue to participate in attracting
large investments from Hollywood blockbusters, thus sustaining the system and
accepting a 2nd tier position in the oligopolistic hierarchy.

Efficacy and generation of the System Globally
As states began to openly compete for what was a finite amount of
production spending and mobile projects, the efficacy and utilization of such
schemes began to become questioned. While the debate is largely dispersed
between cost of subsidies on the one hand and short-term versus long-term gains
on the other, what is clear is that the Subsidization normalization during this period
coalesced with the reconsolidation of the Film Industry into Mass Media
Conglomerates and, as a result, a dramatic increase in both political and economic
power of the MPAA cartel, which had a strong role in developing this system. Even
within general neoliberal pressures to increase competitiveness and open markets,
the dependency generated by the Majors and the MPAA put film in a unique
position. As such, of the total $80 billion of direct subsidizations to corporations

from Washington and US states in 2011, $1.455 billion was for the film industry,
making it one of the most subsidized industries. As mentioned, per job/employee
film subsidization has been about 50% higher than the better known and heavily
subsidized auto industry.
Looking at U.S. state subsidies Thom and An (2017) argue that the strongest
reason for starting a subsidization program revolves around poor economic
conditions as well as high unemployment. This is based around the intention to
provide employment relief, even if the jobs are temporary, as well as help diversify
the economy. Developing infrastructure for an eventual self-sustaining and
attractive production market is commonly cited to defend subsidization schemes,
both on the basis that they are only necessary temporarily but also provide longterm growth (Thom and An, 2017; Davis and Kaye, 2010). On a more short-term
analysis is an examination of the Economic Multiplier effect of bringing in
investment and labor. Even if temporary the defense lies in utilization of local
hotels, restaurants, supplies, and workers, who, even if short-term and below-theline, themselves feed into the local economy.
Some proponents even go so far as to claim the cost of the subsidies can be
below the increased tax revenue from attracted investments, but perhaps one of the
more interesting cited benefits of subsidies, and one pushed by the MPAA,
especially for areas unlikely to develop a substantial local industry, is the promotion
of “film tourism”. Also called “cultural tourism”, this is an attempt to expand the
extent of economic multiplier of subsidies. Especially for locations that are already
attractive for tourism, and for the same reasons attractive for location shooting,
makes an easy target to hold up as a benefit of subsidized production. Louisiana,
one of the states aggressively offering production subsidization, is a good example
of this. A 2015 report funded by the MPAA and local association, Louisiana Film
and Entertainment Association (LFEA), offered the large claim that film and
television tourism (thanks to production credits) generated up to $1.238 billion in
personal income (HR&A, 2015). This is in comparison to the same report’s
estimation that the credit brought $1.039 billion of production spending, and a total
of $10 billion in tourist spending. This large claim comes from comparisons with
Lord of the Rings tourism in New Zealand, however with an emphasis on such local
TV productions as Duck Dynasty and Swamp People.
Beyond the grandiose claim of benefits is the important aspects of the
creation of such reports and their purpose. The MPAA partners with numerous local
associations and small producers (such as the LFEA in Louisiana) for both a local
and broad-based coalition to lobbying local politicians. These reports, which are
naturally exaggerated to the benefits of not only film production but direct

subsidization (and squarely contradict much academic conclusions), are developed
in numerous markets, both domestic and international. While this can be seen as
direct lobbying, or at worst regulatory capture and corruption in many cases, it also
has a larger systemic benefit for the majors when examined holistically. First, is the
clear race-to-the-bottom pressures to attract blockbuster production. Second, is that
relation to local actors helping support such subsidization. Many local producers
and labor groups, such as unions, support the Majors by working with the
association in lobbying politicians, such as seen in the Louisiana report. The power
relationship, beyond immediate dependence on Hollywood spending, is that these
groups insist in reinforcing the structure of their dependence, as the MPAA
develops such relationships in numerous competing locations. When these groups
lobby local politicians, the coalition is legitimized by local interests, supported by
the big money promotion by the Majors, and influenced by and reinforcing the
norm of film subsidies as an economic solution. As Thom and An (2017) argue,
politicians need to appear to be “doing something,” making this system of
dependence and competition among governments, unions, and local independent
producers a boon for the Multinational and mobile MPAA studios.
When examined holistically a group of workers, unions, producers, local
associations, and politicians support the interests of the major Multinationals due
to their own perceived dependence. These four levels of actors--workers, local
producers, politicians, and the Majors--all assist in reinforcing one another through
their own developed ecosystem. Local filmmakers get access to funds with and
without working with larger studios. Film industry workers are forced to rely on
temporary job projects or to face the need to migrate with the mobile projects to
locations with stronger subsidies. Politicians receive funds for government
subsidization and can then claim that they “did something” to help local industry.
The Majors continue to use these political and economic coalitions to deliver the
largest subsidies.

Local Incentives to a Neoliberal Subsidy System
The International Subsidy System at its core is a result of intermixing state
and government interests with that of major corporations. In the need to attract
investment, lower unemployment, and raise competitiveness, subsidization has
become a central measure to participate in the system. While a Canadian province
may have pioneered this particular manner of economic competition, the origin of
the system itself returns to the home state of the MPAA. The support in the United
States for concentrating industries and strengthening corporations was heavily tied
to the growing trade deficit as well as increased competition from growing

economies around the world. For a time these newly empowered and
transnationalized corporations retained American economic leadership in the
neoliberal environment, but after thirty years we have the absurd result today of
costly and artificial competitiveness.
As a result, the systemic race-to-the-bottom and the empowerment of
leading corporations has a spiraling effect. Existing expectations, such as open
markets and low regulation, increases dependence on attracting these corporations,
which itself generates leverage to expand their profit-making expectations, such as
protecting intellectual property rights alongside subsidization. As this dependence
on transnational corporations grows, more actors see the necessity of competing in
the system rather than restructuring it. In other words, as neoliberal capitalism has
both centralized corporate power and opened up labor and regulatory competition
in international markets, impacted actors have seen a decline in the means to
combat the negative structural effects of capitalism in helping to reproduce their
own precarity and disposability. Unions and labor organizations are likely the
strongest example of this as many have flipped from criticizing corporate subsidies
to supporting them as an attempt to ensure job access. Initially unions were some
of the first to challenge the legality of subsidies. Film workers in California, who
were the ones to coin to the term Runaway Production, viewed subsidies in British
Columbia as stealing production from Hollywood (Preston, 2013). Labor
organizations even tried to use Special 301 provision to categorize subsidies as antifree trade:
Industry workers have long been opposed to runaway production,
considering it a form of outsourcing directly attacking their trades, crafts,
jobs, and careers—or, more profoundly, their way of life. Coalitions of
industry workers trying to end the negative consequences of runaway
productions have had two viable options to consider in combating runaway
production: (1) petitioning the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
to determine the legality of foreign film incentives; or (2) lobbying for film
incentives at the state, local, and federal levels. On September 4, 2007, a
group called the Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC), a coalition
composed of unions, municipalities and individuals whose livelihood and
economic security depend on the film and television production industry,
filed a petition with the USTR under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.75
In its petition, FTAC argued that subsidies offered by Canada to lure
production and filming of U.S.-produced television shows and motion
pictures were “inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the [World
Trade Organization] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. McDonald (2011, pp.106)

The protections, laws, and rules that have become important tools for
MNCs, including the US Special 301, ultimately failed in protecting union wages,
benefits and jobs. The growth of dependence on attracting transnationals has
contributed to a system that further entrenches corporate oligarchic power. As
coalitions supporting the International Subsidy System have expanded to include
labor, consumers and other constituents, most governments and politicians have
taken the route of participation in the system. Through this participation there is
little chance of reforming the clear contradictions in competing subsidies, as many
of these states end up reinforcing the hierarchy and control of the Major Studios.
Even if interest groups or associations disagree, they tend to defer to the
more powerful group, which in most cases in film is naturally the MPAA or one or
more of its members, giving more influence in lobbying governments. The EU has
played a leading part in driving market logic and pushing for neoliberal policies.
Specifically, the early EU adopted American lobbying techniques to develop
cohesive corporate-EU representation with the WTO (Schaffer, 2006). With the
neoliberalization of the WTO itself, this corporate relationship and lobbying was
naturally strengthened around more complex trade relations, much like the North
American lobbying system (Young and Peterson, 2006). As corporate-state
relationships became closer, and subsidization became required for the industry,
the International Subsidy System has become global, as chart Leading Subsidies
shows:
Leading International Subsidies6
Estonia
Up to 30% cash rebate for film productions.
Hungary

25% tax incentive on eligible expenses

Lithuania

Cash rebate of up to 20% of the budget

Macedonia

20% cash rebate on Macedonian production costs

Czech Republic

20% rebate on qualifying Czech spending; 66% rebate on international
costs paid to foreign above-the-line cast and crew who pay withholding
tax in the Czech Republic

Croatia

20% rebate on qualifying Croatian expenditure
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Serbia

20% rebate on qualifying Serbian expenditure

Poland

Only Grants apparently

Ireland

32% tax credit on local Irish expenditures

UK

25% cash rebate and up to 80% tax relief

Belgium

The Belgian Tax Shelter allows the finance of up to 45% of Belgianeligible expenses.

France

30% tax rebate on qualifying expenditures in France

Malta

25% cash rebate of eligible expenditure with an additional 2% if the
production features Malta culturally

Italy

25% tax relief on qualifying expenditures

Austria

Cash rebate of 20% eligible production costs

Germany

In recent years, Germany has significantly slashed its federal film funding,
from $95 million to the current $68 million. The DFFF offers a grant that
covers 20% of German production costs with a maximum grant limit of
$4.5 million (and $11 million in exceptional cases). Germany also has 17
regional film commissions to help with production logistics and funds.

Iceland

25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses

Norway

25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses

Singapore

In 2004, the Singapore Tourism Board introduced the "Film in Singapore
Scheme," which promotes production in the country by subsidizing up to
50% of qualifying expenses incurred in Singapore, including local talent,
production staff, and production services. Additionally, there are various
grants available through the MDAS, including a "Production Assistance"
grant that supports up to 40% of qualifying expenses.

Malaysia

30% cash rebate in qualifying local expenditure

Fiji

Film Fiji offers a whopping 47% tax rebate on production spend in the
country.

Australia

Producer Offset (40% rebate on productions shot in Australia); PDV
Offset (30% rebate on post-production work conducted in Australia,
regardless of where the production was shot)

New Zealand

The New Zealand Screen Production Grant offers a 20% cash rebate to
qualifying expenditures; you can also qualify for an additional 5% uplift
if your project meets requirements proving it will boost the country's
economy

Canada

Depending on the province, producers can access combined federal and
provincial tax credits ranging from 32% to 70% of eligible labor, as well
as tax incentives on local qualifying spend ranging from 20% to 30%.

Colombia

Two-tier cash rebate system provides 40% for film services (including
services related to post-production, artistic, and technical services), and
another 20% for film logistical services (including services provided for
transport, accommodation, and food)

Trinidad & Tobago Cash rebates up to 55% for expenditures on qualifying local labor and 35%
on other local expenditures
Puerto Rico

40% production tax credit on all payments to Puerto Rico resident
companies and individuals

Dominican
Republic

25% transferable tax credit on all eligible expenditures including preproduction, production, and post-production

Panama

15% cash rebate

Abu Dhabi

30% cash rebate on production spend; no sales tax

South Africa

20% tax credit (production), 25% tax credit (post-production)

While Subsidy programs were clearly designed with local incentives in
mind, the contradictions that come out of a competitive subsidization process are
apparent in the growth of the power and privilege of a Mass Media Oligarchy. The
chart above lists only the highest offers of film production subsidies around the

world, and therefore does not cover the entire scope of the subsidization system.
For the Major Studios of the MPAA, the international subsidy system is both an
effect and reinforcement of the global film oligopoly. With an international system
of rules against classical protectionism, states have naturally moved into supporting
the supply-side of production incentives, which is encouraged by rules codified
within the WTO and within regional trade agreements. While one may expect
subsidies to be the next anti-free trade topic for the WTO and trade agreements,
that they reinforce the corporate power that participated in their development makes
that unlikely.
Rather, the Mass Media Oligopoly are focused on using international trade
negotiations to promote a continuous expansion of Intellectual Property Rights and
Copyright protection. Unless the system is greatly restructured, states will continue
to choose between subsidizing leading industries, or seeing them flee, especially
for those that are most mobile. For the Major studios, who receive the bulk of
subsidies, are the most globally mobile, and have international access to
partnerships and distribution, this system helps reinforce both their economic and
political leverage, but also in building a larger coalition of labor and smaller studios
who in turn expand their systemic influence.

References
Bernstein, Irving (1060) The Economics of Television Film Production And
Distribution: A Report to Screen Actors Guild. Sherman Oaks, Calif.
Bishop-Henchman, Joseph (September 29, 2016) “California LAO Finds $1 of
Every $3 in Film Incentives Go to Projects that Would have Happened
Anyway.” Tax Foundation. Available online at:
https://taxfoundation.org/california-lao-finds-1-every-3-film-incentives-go
-projects-would-have-happened-anyway/
Boedeker, Hal (November 30, 2014). “What is the State of Film, TV Productions
in Florida?” Orlando Sentinel. Available online at:
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-film-tv-production-florida20141124-story.html
Buder, Emily (August 22, 2016). “The Best Countries in the World to Film Your
Movie, Based on Production Incentives.” No Film School. Available
online at: https://nofilmschool.com/2016/07/film-production-incentivestax-incentives-movie-rebates
Christopherson, Susan and Storper, Michael. (1986). “The City as Studio, the
World as Back-lot: The Impact of Vertical Disintegration on the Location
of the Motion-Picture Industry.” Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space, 4 (3), 305-320
Crafton, Donald (1999). The talkies: American cinema's transition to sound,
1926-1931 (Vol. 4). Univ of California Press.
CFTPA/APFTQ (2008). Profile 2008: An economic report on the Canadian film
and television production industry. Ottawa: Canadian Film and Television
Production Association/Association des Producteurs de Films et de
Télévision du Québec and Department of Canadian Heritage
Cooke, Paul (2007). “Supporting contemporary German film: How triumphant is
the free market?” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 15(1), 3546.

Davis, Charles H. and Kaye, Janice (2010) “International Film and Television
Production Outsourcing and the Development of Indigenous Capabilities:
The Case of Canada.” In G. Elmer et al., eds., Locating Migrating Media.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Deutsche Welle (March 16, 2017). “German Government to Double Film
Subsidies.” Deutsche Welle. Available online at:
http://www.dw.com/en/german-government-to-double-film-subsidies/a37960001
Epstein, Edward Jay (April 25, 2005). “How to Finance a Hollywood
Blockbuster: Start with German Subsidies.” Slate. Available online at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_hollywood_economist/2005/04/how
_to_finance_a_hollywood_blockbuster.html
Film Florida (August 2013). “Stakeholder Interview Briefing.” Available online
at: https://www.scribd.com/document/207191802/Film-FloridaStakeholder-Interview-Briefing-Report-by-Think-Spot-Prepared-for-FilmFlorida-August-2013
Gasher, Mike (2002). Hollywood North: The Feature Film Industry in British
Columbia. UBC Press. Vancouver.
Hanks, Douglas (January, 29, 2014). “With Florida Film Incentives Drying up,
Industry Worries about a Statewide ‘Cut’!.” Miami Herald. Available
online at: http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1959720.html
HR&A Advisors, Inc (2015). “Economic Impacts of the Louisiana Motion Picture
Investor Tax Credit.” Available online at: https://www.mpaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Economic-Impacts-of-the-Louisiana-MotionPicture-Investor-Tax-Credit1.pdf
Irwin, Janelle (October 20, 2017). “Film Incentives Back on the Table in 2018.”
Tampa Bay Business Journal. Available online at:
https://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2017/10/20/film-incentivesback-on-the-table-in-2018.html
Jansen, Christian (2005). “The Performance of German Motion Pictures, Profits,
and Subsidies: Some Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Cultural
Economics, 29(3). 191-212

Johnson, Ted (June 17, 2015).” Georgia Crafts a Peachy Deal to Keep
Productions Filming in the State.” Variety. Available online at:
http://variety.com/2015/artisans/production/georgia-deal-to-keepproductions-in-state-1201521401/
Lev, Peter (2003). Transforming the Screen, 1950-1959. University of California
Press.
Lindsey, Daryl (2006) “The German New Wave.” Der Spiegel Online. Available
online at:
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,400156,00.html
Lynch, Robert (1996). “Do State and Local Tax Incentives Work?”. Economic
Policy Institute. Washington, D.C.
Maddaus, Gene (August 28, 2014). “Here are the Winners and Losers in
California’s $330 Million Film Tax Subsidy.” LA Weekly. Available
online at: http://www.laweekly.com/news/here-are-the-winners-andlosers-in-californias-330-million-film-tax-subsidy-5036475
McDonald, Adrian (2011). “Down the Rabbit Hole: The Madness of State Film
Incentives as a “Solution” to Runaway Production.” Journal of Business
Law (University of Pennsylvania). 13(1), 101-181
McDonald, Adrian (2011). “2016 Feature Film Study.” Film L.A. Available
online at: https://www.filmla.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/2016_film_study_WEB.pdf
McWhirter, Cameron and Schwartzel, Erich (February 6, 2015). “Georgia’s
Booming Film Industry Produces Shortage of Crew Members.” The Wall
Street Journal. Available online at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/georgias-booming-film-industry-producesshortage-of-crew-members-1423242778
Monaco, Paul (2003) The Sixties: 1960-1969. University of California Press.
Preston, Patrick (2013). “If You Scale Back Now, you Probably Lose
Everything”: State Tax Incentives and the Motion Picture Industry.”
MEIEA, 13(1), 181-205

Thom, Michael.(2016). “Lights, Camera, but no action? Tax and economic
development lessons from state motion picture incentive programs.”
American Review of Public Administration.
Thom, Michael, and An, Brian (2017). “Fade to Black? Exploring Policy
Enactment and Termination through the Rise and Fall of State Tax
Incentives for the Motion Picture Industry.” American Politics Research,
45(1), 85–108.
Scott, Allen (2002). “A New Map of Hollywood: The Production and Distribution
Of American Motion Pictures.” Regional Studies, 36(9), 957-75.
Shaffer, Gregory (2006). “What's new in EU trade dispute settlement?
Judicialization, public–private networks and the WTO legal order.”
Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 832-850.
Spaner, David (2012). Shot It!: Hollywood Inc. and the Rising of Independent
Film. Arsenal Pulp Press: Vancouver, BC
Seabury, William Marston (1926). The Public and the Motion Picture Industry.
The Macmillan Company: New York
Story, Louise; Fehr, Tiff, and Watkins, Derek (2016). “United States of
Subsidies.” The New York Times. Available online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/governmentincentives.html?_r=0#home
Taddeo, Annette (2018). Florida Motion Picture Capital Corporation Bill
Proposal. Available online at:
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/1606/BillText/__/PDF
Tannenwald, Robert (2010). “State Film Subsidies: Not Much Band for Too
Many
Bucks.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Available online at:
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-film-subsidies-not-much-bang-fortoo-many-bucks
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). Databases, Tables & Calculators by
Subject. Available online at:
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3133600101?amp%253bdata_tool=XG
table&output_view=data&include_graphs=true

U.S. Census Bureau (February 10. 2015). “Motion Picture and Video Receipts
Exceed $80 Billion, According to Census Bureau.” Available online at:
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-25.html
Walser, Adam (August 22, 2016). “Lack of Subsidies in Film Industry Driving
Florida Jobs to Other States.” ABC News. Available online at:
https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/i-teaminvestigates/lack-of-subsidies-in-film-industry-driving-florida-jobs-toother-states
Weatherford, Brian (2016). “California’s First Film Tax Credit Program.” The
Legislative Analyst’s Office. Available online at:
https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2016/3502/First-Film-Tax-Credit-Prog092916.pdf
Wilcox, Ben and Krassner, Dan (February 17, 2014). “Florida Film Incentives:
“Action” or “Fade to Black”?.” Integrity Florida. Available online at:
http://files.ctctcdn.com/d9f43dd5201/e93e102e-8034-41bc-a8a0f2a3f3d5ab65.pdf
Young, Alasdair R., & Peterson, Joh. (2006). “The EU and the new trade
politics.” Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 795-814.

